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Reports of the death of remedies and redress for the injurious acts of
federal tortfeasors have been greatly exaggerated, or at least are premature.
While the Supreme Court seems intent on continuing to nail the coffin of the
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erstwhile Bivens remedy shut, 1 a unique and largely unexplored interplay
between the Federal Tort Claims Act and state civil rights torts offers an
alternate course for plaintiffs seeking monetary relief against federal
tortfeasors. Such a remedy may be increasingly useful as the expansion of
federal policing efforts in the United States—for immigration and other
purposes—gives rise to an increasing number of civil rights violations. By
changing the focus of a plaintiff’s claim from the Constitutional violation at
hand to the civil rights violations they represent—as defined by state tort
law—plaintiffs may still have the opportunity for redress via a “Backdoor
Bivens” claim.
In general, federal sovereign immunity is an absolute bar to suits against
the United States, absent a clear waiver of such immunity. 2 In 1946,
Congress provided such a waiver for federal tortfeasors in the form of the
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). The FTCA provides an opportunity for
those claiming injury to sue the United States for injurious acts committed
by federal employees in the scope of their employment. 3 Liability is
determined based on the “law of the place” where the tortious act or omission
occurred.4 Many states have extensive statutory schemes that protect against
discrimination in public accommodation and provide private rights of action
as an opportunity for redress against tortfeasors.
This Comment argues that the Federal Tort Claims Act permits suit
against the United States based on state law theories of tort that would
otherwise be phrased in a Bivens action. Plaintiffs seeking redress against the
federal government for Constitutional violations should claim focus on their
injuries as stated by state prohibitions against discrimination in places of
public accommodation. By shifting their focus, plaintiffs can still receive
compensation for discriminatory and injurious acts by federal tortfeasors
without running afoul of the corpse of the Bivens doctrine. Relying on state
statutory schemes that were meant to universalize constitutional equality
similarly avoids any potential scope issues with the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Admittedly, such a remedy is limited to states that allow a private right of
action for discrimination in public accommodation and do not require state
administrative exhaustion before such a right can be exercised. Similarly,
1

2
3
4

See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020). The Court’s ruling in Hernandez effectively
permanently closed the door on the availability of the so-called Bivens remedy to obtain monetary
relief for violations of federal constitutional rights, save for extremely rare circumstances.
Price v. U.S., 174 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1899) (“It is an axiom of our jurisprudence. The Government
is not liable to suit unless it consents thereto.”).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671.
Id.
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this remedy would not aid claimants whose injuries did not stem from
discriminatory acts. Yet as avenues of redress against the federal government
are slowly but steadily cut off, this backdoor remedy provides at least one
small opportunity for compensation.
Part I first identifies the concept of a state civil rights tort and identifies
states where private rights of action for their violation exists through a fiftystate survey. Part II illuminates the background and requirements of the
Federal Tort Claims Act with an eye to the idea that it was written to be an
expansive, unlimited remedy based on state tort schemes. Part III illustrates
the workability of the remedy, with special focus on its mechanics. Part III
also addresses two potential concerns with the concept and limits the
applicability accordingly.
This is not a universal remedy and is limited to just 24 states and the
District of Columbia. It does, however, offer at least some succor and redress
to ensure persons injured by federal tortfeasors in an era where doors seem
to be slamming shut.
I. IDENTIFYING STATE CIVIL RIGHTS TORTS
In keeping with their status as laboratories of democracy,5 it is fitting that
the fifty states have vastly different approaches to what civil rights protections
they enshrine in their statutory schemes. While the rationales for the various
approaches may be disparate, the result is the broad ability for states to
experiment with a broad swath of civil rights laws—so long as they fall within
the general guidelines created by federal statutes and constitutional rights.6
Accordingly, states like New York now impose civil liability against persons
who summon emergency services against members of protected classes when
there is no “reason to suspect a violation of the penal law, any other criminal
conduct, or an imminent threat to a person or property.”7
Alongside civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms, many states have
created private rights of action that allow complainants to independently

5

6

7

See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“There must
be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic
practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs . . . It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
Cf. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment required
the State of Ohio to recognize a same-sex marriage when the marriage was lawfully licensed and
performed out of the state).
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-N(2) (McKinney 2020).
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vindicate civil rights violations. In the realm of civil rights, such private rights
have numerous benefits, including incentivizing private attorneys to litigate
more civil rights claims8 and easing the investigatory and financial burden
on enforcement agencies in enforcing civil rights laws.9
A. Remedial Variations in State Civil Rights Schemes
Most states provide such private rights of action by proscribing
discrimination in places of public accommodation and allowing private suit
for violations thereof. Regulation of public accommodation has a
universality in its scope that ensures that a particular protection applies to as
broad a swath of people as possible, rather than being limited to unique
situations or niche industries.10 While Title II of the federal Civil Rights Act
of 1964 provides a de minimis level of civil rights protections however, state
public accommodation statutes provide a more diverse tapestry of protected
classes and remedial approaches.
However, states vary greatly in what protections they include in their
statutory schemes. Five states—Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and Texas—only prohibit discrimination against disabled
individuals in public accommodations. 11 While the remaining forty-five
prohibit discrimination against race, gender, ancestry, and religion, only
nineteen go so far as to include age as a protected class.12
Greater state-by-state distinction is found in the remedies offered to
victims of discrimination in public accommodations. Some states impose
criminal penalties in the form of misdemeanors or potential jail time, for
instance, while others impose civil penalties after a mandatory tribunal with
8

9

10
11

12

See, e.g., Sean Farhang, Congressional Mobilization of Private Litigants: Evidence from the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 12-13 (2009) (stating that, according to Senator Kennedy,
there is a study showing that “there are scores of cases, which . . . have some merit, that are not
being brought because there are inadequate incentives, even with attorneys' fees.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif,
132 F.3d 925, No. 97-1125 (3rd Cir. 1997) (“Because of the inherent limitations on administrative
enforcement mechanisms and on the litigation resources of the United States . . . private suits are
critical to ensuring optimal enforcement of [the Civil Rights Act of 1964].”).
See, e.g., Brian K. Landsberg, Public Accommodations and the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Surprising Success?,
36 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 18-19 (2015) (describing factors that lead to success of Title II).
State Public Accommodation Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 8,
2019) (available at https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-publicaccommodation-laws.aspx) [https://perma.cc/72EJ-6ZY3].
These states are: Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Id.

1122

[Vol. 23:5

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

a “Human Rights” or “Civil Rights Commission.” In some Commission
states, the outcome of the administrative process is the exclusive remedy
available to complainants, while others merely require administrative
exhaustion before a civil action can be filed. In all, there are eleven different
pathways for complainants, which can be broadly summarized into one of
three groupings, as below:

Comm’n
Comm’n Remedy
Exists?
Exclusive?
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

Exhaustion
Prerequisite Private
for Civil
Right of
Action?
Action?

Criminal
Penalties
Available?
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

Sum
5
5
3
4
1
6
2
16
5
3
1

Broad
Statutory
Scheme
No Private
Right of
Action
(18 states)13
Exhaustion
Required
(8 states)14
Private Right
of Action
(24 states
and D.C.)15

Complainants face one of three statutory schemes: (1) no private right of
action exists, if any remedy exists, it must be the result of an administrative
process; (2) while private rights of action exist, complainants must first fully
exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing a claim; and (3) an
independent private right of action exists, regardless of the existence of any
administrative process.
The first form, of course, is the most restrictive. Here, complainants have
no private right to redress in cases of discrimination in public
accommodation, relying instead on state criminal or civil administrative
13

14
15

Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and
Wyoming. See supra note 11.
Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
See supra note 11.
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processes for any form of redress. When such relief comes, it is frequently
limited to nominal damages, or injunctive relief. The other two forms are
more expansive, allowing complainants to bring suit in state court to obtain
monetary or injunctive relief from complained-of discriminatory acts.
However, eight states condition such suit on a mandatory exhaustion of
administrative process, placing an additional hurdle in the way of legal
redress.
B. Private Rights of Action as State Civil Rights Torts
These independent rights of action are statutory torts and thus can be
envisioned as “state civil rights torts.” These torts are fundamentally
equivalent to common-law torts in their interpretation and application by the
courts. Definitionally, a tort is a tort if it describes a civil wrong for which a
remedy may be obtained, regardless of its font in statutory or common-law
text. 16 Admittedly, common-law tort actions have a deep doctrinal
grounding, while statutory tort actions are a more recent innovation. 17
However, statutory torts are not a newly birthed sibling of common-law torts,
but rather an outgrowth of the same.
The first century of American history looked to judges as “problemsolvers” for the “dizzying pace of social, economic, and technological
change” experienced by the new country, in a world with scant legislative
action.18 Of course, this is not to say that federal and state legislatures were
silent; instead, judges and the judiciary were seen as the ideal arbiters of
societal change—no one judge could fundamentally change an entire system,
instead they acted in part with the hundreds of other judges across the
country to make steady, but incremental change to the system. 19 This
system, especially as applied to tort law, was hardly an innovation, with deep
roots in the ancient “writ” system of medieval England.20
Statutory torts emerged less in the wake of this system, and more as a
response to the changing nature of our judiciary. First, a rapid increase in
law-making tied to the New Deal and other similar administrative programs
necessitated a greater focus on statutory interpretation within the court

16
17
18
19
20

See, e.g., Tort, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 n.1 (1982).
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 35-36 (1st ed. 1977).
CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 4-5.
Cf. O.L. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Actions, 34 YALE L. J. 614, 625 n.1, 638 (1925).
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system, rather than matters of equity. 21 These laws were increasingly
complex, and intended to be statements of law, rather than codifications of
common law as promulgated by the courts.22 Second and equally important
was the turn-of-the century shift in the role of the federal judiciary. For much
of its history, the federal judiciary frequently engaged in the creation of a
general common law,23 which frequently included the field of tort law.24 In
1938, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
rejected this approach, famously stating that “there is no federal general
common law.” 25 While, of course, courts retained some ability to create
federal common law, Erie decisively abrogated the ability of federal courts to
promulgate general common law, especially as it pertained to tort actions.26
Given the definitional roles of the legislature and the judiciary,27 then, courts’
role as interpreters, rather than promulgators became more and more
central.28
Thus, statutory torts and common law torts are siblings, especially as
applied by federal courts. While they are certainly distinct in their origin,
they operate conterminously, and in an intermixed fashion. The Supreme
Court still considers and promulgates general rules of tort liability, 29 and
statutory torts remain reflective of attempts to codify common-law tort
actions.30

21
22
23
24

25
26
27
28
29

30

CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 5; Mark A Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REV.
957, 959-60 (2014).
Geistfeld, supra note 21 at 959-60.
See generally Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex Parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts, 1890—1917, 40 U.
TOL. L. REV. 931, 947 (2009) (“[B]y the late nineteenth century the federal courts had stretched
the ‘general’ law to include most common-law fields, including . . . torts.”).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
See, e.g., id. at 79; Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 585, 586 n.8 (2006).
See generally Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 5.
See, e.g., id.; John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return to the
Common Law of Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 441-42 (2016) (discussing the case of Gertz where the
majority of the Court held, “in the modern world, all torts, including the defamation torts, ought
to track the contours of the tort of negligence.”).
See Ronald W. Eades, Attempts to Federalize and Codify Tort Law, 36 Tort & Ins. L. J. 1, 8-9 (2000)
(discussing history of codification movement in the United States during the early nineteenth
century).
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II. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND ITS AMBIT
A. Background and Legislative History
The Federal Tort Claims Act finds its roots in the English doctrine that
the King can do no wrong. 31 Paradoxically, perhaps, the same doctrine
admits that while the King can do no wrong intentionally, he still can provide
opportunities for redress for any incidental “wrongs.” 32 This concept
eventually emerged in American jurisprudence in the early 19th century as
sovereign immunity. 33 Perhaps by virtue of the broader post-colonial
enterprise, however, the American doctrine focused more on the
government’s inability to be sued, rather than a sacred inability to commit a
wrong. 34 Absent a legislative enactment waiving this general immunity,
federal tortfeasors were thus broadly immunized in the nation’s early history,
even when the common law provided for ample relief against analogous
private tortfeasors. During this period, claimants against federal tortfeasors
were limited to petitioning Members of Congress for private legislation
authorizing specific relief.35
By the early twentieth century, this process had ballooned to
unsustainability, with the private bills consuming inordinate amount of
Congressional time, effort, and resources.36 Moreover, it became impossible

31

32

33
34

35

36

See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715-16 (1999) (“Although the American people had rejected
other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its
consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.”); Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 437-38 (describing the history of the English doctrine that the King
was sovereign and thus not open to suit) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *243,
*253)).
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163 (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury . . . In Great
Britain the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with
the judgment of his court.”). See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty,
Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 532 (2003) (discussing the
background of suits against the Crown), Herbert Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 U. VA. L.
REV. 349, 355-58 (1925) (describing the historical development of petitions Crown’s sovereign
immunity in the context of “certain colonial statutes” permitting the same).
Jackson, supra note 32, at 523-24.
Langford v. U.S., 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879) (“It is not easy to see how the first proposition [that ‘the
King can do no wrong’] can have any place in our system of government . . . [w]e do not understand
that . . . the English maxim has an existence in this country.”); Barry, supra note 32, at 358-64.
See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Litigation with the Federal Government § 3.2 (2016); Paul Figley, Ethical
Intersections & The Federal Tort Claims Act: An Approach for Government Attorneys, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L. J.
347, 348-49 (2011) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.7 “No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”)).
Figley, supra note 35, at 350-51.
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for Congressional representatives to adequately devote the time and energy
necessary to properly adjudicate the claims presented in each private bill.37
To remedy the issue, Congress made numerous attempts at instituting early
versions of what would eventually become the FTCA. In 1929, for instance,
a bill giving the Comptroller General to broadly settle and defend claims
passed both houses of Congress, only to be pocket vetoed by President
Coolidge. 38 Notably, this first attempt rejected the notion of laying out
specific rules of law and equity that would govern potential claims. Three
subsequent attempts failed to make it out of committee, all with similar
rejections of particularized rules and pre-defined bases for claims.39
A penultimate attempt at passage, S. 2221, nearly made it fully through
the 77th Congress, passing the Senate, and ultimately dying in the House
before the end of session. S. 2221 is remarkable in the context of the FTCA
for two reasons. First, it marks the final appearance of a negligence standard
in the text of proposed tort claim reform. 40 Second, it demonstrates the
importance and necessity of tort claim reform in Congress. S.2221 was
introduced in the Senate in late 1941 and passed on March 1942—a
historical period marked by the attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States
declaring war on Japan and Germany, inter alia.41 To that end, tort claim
reform became a part of the “national defense effort,” as private bills of
“lesser importance . . . consume[d] considerable time and effort,” preventing
attention to other bills more crucial to the impending war.42

37
38
39

40
41

42

Id.
Edwin M. Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1933).
See Alexander Holtzoff, Tort Claims against the United States, 25 A.B.A. J. 828 (1939); Note, The Federal
Tort Claims Act, 56 Yale L.J. 534, 535-36 n.10 (1947) (“H. R. 7236 was reported favorably by the
House Committee on the Judiciary, H. R. Res. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), and passed
the House; but after hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee did not report S. 2690, and the
measure died.”); Note, Settlement of Tort Claims Against the Government by Private Acts, 50 Yale L. J. 328,
332 n. 21 (1940).
88 Cong. Rec. 3174.
Id. at 9504-05 (address of President Franklin D. Roosevelt); United States Cong. Joint Resolution
Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Imperial Government of Japan and the Government and the People
of the United States, 77th Cong. S.J. Res. 116, 55 Stat. 561 (1941); United States Cong. Joint Resolution
Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Government of Germany and the Government and the People of the
United States, 77th Cong. S.J. Res. 119, 55 Stat. 564 (1941).
88 Cong. Rec. 313 (1942) (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt). President Roosevelt’s
message sharply criticized the degree to which the private bill system consumed the process of
legislating and advocated for a new system for “dispensing justice simply and effectively to tort
claimants against the Government.” Id. at 314. Notably, the President’s message framed the
importance for sweeping tort claim reform as co-equal with national demands related to World
War II. Id.

December 2021]

A BACKDOOR BIVENS REMEDY

1127

The attention given here to the overwhelming nature of the private bill
system indicates a deeper focus on divorcing tort claims from the legislative
process entirely, rather than merely excluding certain varieties of torts from
the legislative process. Indeed, the universal delegation of tort claims from
the legislative to the judicial process was a potential poison pill before the
Act’s passage. While the bill was being considered on the Senate floor, one
Senator rose to oppose the bill based on the “unlimited power of suit [it
would provide] against the Federal Government,” fearing that allowing all
claims against the United States to proceed in court would result in “a great
many cases, . . . that the courts would hardly be able to function.”43 The
Senator’s objection, however, seemed overridden by the general idea that
universal adjudication of tort claims in the judiciary would ensure more
competent adjudication of such claims.44 Thus was born the FTCA—a small
hole in the government’s armor of sovereign immunity, borne out of a simple
need for legislative efficiency.
While the act was amended for numerous minor reasons in the decades
following its enactment, its most substantive change came in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Westfall v. Erwin in 1988.45 In Westfall, a federal
employee who suffered chemical burns while working in a warehouse filed a
state-tort claim against his employers for negligently allowing toxic materials
to be placed in the warehouse without informing him.46 In a decision that
focused mainly on the question of the absolute immunity of the federal
officers involved, 47 the Court ruled that applying official immunity first
required a case-by-case analysis of whether the conduct was “discretionary
in nature.”48 The Court, acknowledging that it was ill-placed to formulate a
general immunity rule, simultaneously invited Congress to provide guidance
on the question of absolute immunity for federal employees.49

43
44

45
46
47

48
49

92 Cong. Rec. 6373 (1946) (statement of Sen. Walter F. George).
92 Cong. Rec. 10029 (1946) (statement of Rep. Mike Monroney) (1946) (“[I]n this claims section
every time we have closed the door of admittance of a claim on the floor of Congress we have
opened up another door in the administrative departments or in the courts of the land so that those
claims can be adequately adjudicated.”)
484 U.S. 292 (1988), superseded by statute, Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564
(1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)).
Westfall, 484 U.S. at 293-94.
Petitioners framed their question presented as one of the degrees of immunity afforded to federal
officers for injuries committed under state tort law for their official acts. Brief for Petitioners at *1,
Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988) (No. 86-714).
Westfall, 484 U.S. at 298-99.
Id. at 300.
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Congress heeded the Court’s call with the Federal Employee Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act,50 passed a scant ten months and five
days after the Westfall decision. Colloquially known as the Westfall Act, the
Act grants federal government employees acting within the scope of their
employment immunity from common-law causes of action and directs that
state law tort claims against federal defendants substitute the United States
as a defendant and be converted to an FTCA suit.51 The main purpose of
the Westfall Act is to immunize federal employees from ordinary state
common-law tort suits, and to make the FTCA the exclusive remedy for all
tort actions against federal employees.52 Until the Westfall Act, the FTCA
was only the exclusive remedy for tort actions resulting from car accidents—
federal employees could still be sued under state tort law provisions.53 Now,
the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for injurious acts committed by federal
employees acting in the scope of their employment.54
B. Requirements for Successful FTCA Claims
Prerequisites for a successful Federal Tort Claims Act are informed both
by the statutory text and judicial precedent. FTCA plaintiffs initiate their
claim by filing an administrative claim with the agency responsible for the
alleged tortious conduct within two years of the act in question.55 The claim
must be fully examined and the administrative process fully exhausted before
a suit may commence.56 Claims must state a specific amount of monetary
damages,57 including an estimation of any contemplated future damages yet
to accrue.58
Substantive liability is limited to injurious acts resulting in personal
injury, death, or property damage caused by federal employees’ negligent or
wrongful acts or omissions.59 Broadly speaking, damages cannot include pre-

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

59

Pub. L. No. 100-694, §§5, 6, 102 Stat. 4564-65 (1988) (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)-(d)).
Id.
See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Litigation with the Federal Government § 5.6(c)(1) (2016).
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (amended 1988); Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the
Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 567 (2013).
Id. at 569.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a) (2012).
Id.; McNeil v. U.S., 508 U.S. 106, 111 (1993).
28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (2012).
See, e.g., White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Service, 592 F.3d 453, 458 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding claimant’s
duty to present a claim for a sum certain includes the obligation to include ongoing medical
expenses in such claim).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012).
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judgment interest, punitive damages, or recurring payments to claimants,60
though there is significant nuance to the definition and mechanics of punitive
damages and recurring payments.61 In all valid FTCA claims, the United
States is mandatorily substituted as the defendant, as opposed to the tortious
employee or agency themselves.62 Most important for the purpose of this
Comment, however, are the “law of the state” and “private person”
requirements.
In drafting the FTCA, Congress sought to avoid narrowly defining what
torts were redressable under the act, seeking to completely dissolve their
administrative burden.63 Resultantly, the FTCA claims are governed by the
“law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 64 This is strictly
construed as adopting the state law of where the act occurred, with a total
bar on the use of federal law as the basis for a claim.65 In substituting the
United States into such claims, the FTCA dictates that it shall be held liable
in tort “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual”
would be.66
Major exceptions to FTCA liability include if the allegedly tortious act
occurred as an element of a federal employee’s discretionary function, or if
they were exercising due care in their actions.67 The FTCA also excepts
liability for certain intentional torts: assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. 68 Circuit
courts are divided if the intentional tort exception includes intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims, though success of such claims
may depend heavily on the nature of the facts in question.69 As may be
expected, the various amendments and opportunities for judicial
interpretation of the FTCA have yielded a myriad other guidelines and

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).
See Gregory C. Sisk, Litigation with the Federal Government §§ 3.7(c) Exclusion of Punitive Damages, 3.7(d)
Unavailability of Continuing Obligations or Periodic Payments (2016).
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3) (2012).
See supra Section II.A.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012).
See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994).
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2012).
See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Litigation with the Federal Government § 3.6(d)(5) (2016). See generally David W.
Fuller, Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 375,
389-97 (2011) (explaining the history and the contemporary applications of IIED claims in the
FTCA).
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exceptions, though their full treatment has been much more judiciously
addressed by other scholars.70

III. BACKDOOR BIVENS: STATE CIVIL RIGHTS TORTS AS
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
A Bivens remedy is a judicial creation that recognizes an implied cause of
action for individuals whose Constitutional rights are violated by federal
officers.71 As first created in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, the Supreme Court
recognized an implied cause of action for a private plaintiff who alleged his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when six federal agents burst into
his apartment in the early morning, manacled him in front of his family, and
removed him to a federal courthouse without a warrant or probable cause.72
In identifying the propriety of such an implied cause of action, the Court took
note that “damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an
invasion of personal interests in liberty.” 73 Subsequently, the Court
recognized a Bivens remedy for a Fifth Amendment violation in Davis v.
Passman,74 and for an Eighth Amendment violation in Carlson v. Green.75 Here
the expansion ended. Over the next two decades, the Court aggressively
contracted the Bivens 7677 away from the “ancien regime” in which Bivens
emerged. 78 Following the Court’s decision in Hernandez v. Mesa,
commentators have noted that the doctrine is all but dead and an unlikely
avenue for redress for potential aggrieved plaintiffs.7980

70
71
72
73
74
75
76

77
78
79

80

See Gregory C. Sisk, Litigation with the Federal Government, §§ 3.2-3.8 (2016).
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97
(1971).
Id. at 389-90.
Id. at 395.
442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979).
446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).
See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 (2012) (denying a Bivens action for Eighth Amendment
violations because of the existence of alternative state tort law remedies); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551
U.S. 537 (2007) (declining to extend a Bivens remedy against private prisons); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer,
510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (rejecting “[a]n extension of Bivens to agencies of the Federal
Government.”).
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017).
Id. (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 432 U.S. 275, 287 (2001)).
See, e.g., Cassandra Robertson, SCOTUS Sharply Limits Bivens Claims–and Hints at Further Retrenchment,
AMERICAN
BAR
ASSOCIATION:
PRACTICE
POINTS
(Apr.
14,
2020)
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/civil-rights/practice/2020/scotussharply-limits-bivens-claims-and-hints-at-further-retrenchment/[https://perma.cc/CH3D-7F9J].
See, e.g., Bivens Act of 2020, H.R. 7213, 116th Cong. (2020).
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A. Mechanics and Applications
Until such a codification occurs, the state civil rights torts identified
above, deployed within the scope of the FTCA, offer a sort of “backdoor
Bivens” for potentially aggrieved plaintiffs. Instead of focusing on the
Constitutional violations of federal officers, claimants should focus on their
tortious acts, as recognized by anti-discrimination in public accommodation
statutes. A claim for unlawful search and seizure might instead transform
into a claim of discrimination in a place of public accommodation, especially
given increased reports of racial discrimination by federal law enforcement,
those responsible for enforcing immigration laws.81
The ongoing case of Zelaya v. Hammer is particularly demonstrative. In
this case, plaintiffs working at a Tennessee meat processing plant allege that
they were subjected to exceedingly harsh and unconstitutional treatment at
the hands of ICE agents conducting an immigration raid by virtue of their
being Latino. 82 During the raid, the plant’s white workers were neither
detained nor subjected to the same “intrusive and aggressive treatment” as
the Latino workers.83 In bringing suit, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, a Fourth
and Fifth Amendment Bivens claim against defendant ICE agents, claiming a
clear infringement of their Constitutional rights. 84 However, the federal
district court dismissed these claims, citing Ziglar and Hernandez to conclude
that a race-based Bivens claim would be a new context requiring the
expansion of the Bivens doctrine, and that the special factors counseled
hesitation in so doing.85
Recognizing that even the best-argued Bivens claim may be a quixotic
effort in current jurisprudence, plaintiffs might instead attempt to bring an
FTCA claim using a state civil rights tort as the cause of action. Tennessee’s
bar against discrimination in places of public accommodation, for instance,
allows complainants a private right of action against alleged tortfeasors.86
Though the point of whether a meat processing plant is a public
accommodation is likely to be litigated, precedent shows the plaintiffs would

81

82
83
84
85
86

See, e.g., Kavitha Surana, How Racial Profiling Goes Unchecked in Immigration Enforcement, PROPUBLICA
(June 8, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/racial-profiling-ice-immigration-enforcementpennsylvania) [https://perma.cc/UR35-3QJL] (describing instances of Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement officers relying heavily on racial profiling to enforce immigration laws).
Complaint at 2, Zelaya v. Miles, No. 3:19-CV-00062 (E.D. Tenn., Feb. 21, 2019) (Dkt. No. 1).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 25-29.
Zelaya v. Hammer, No. 3:19-CV-00062, 2021 WL 424434 at *17-20 (E.D. Tenn., Jan. 31, 2021).
TENN. CODE §§ 4-21-501 & 4-21-311(a) (2019); see also supra Section I.A.
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have a winning argument.87 A suit against federal tortfeasors, as in Zelaya,
would rely on this statute as the cause of action under the FTCA as a
potential cause of action. While the constitutional right in question may not
be addressed, and damages would be limited to those incurred by virtue of
the tortious act, as opposed to the punitive and injunctive relief available
under Bivens, this approach would at least allow some avenue of redress
against federal tortfeasors.
This theory has already been tested semi-successfully. In California,
Guadalupe Robles Plascencia was detained by her local police department
under an immigration detainer88 when she arrived to retrieve her property
after a car accident 89 after which she was arrested and detained by ICE
agents.90 During her detention, ICE agents taunted and physically restrained
her; refusing to listen to her pleas that she was a U.S. citizen.91 At one point,
an agent indicated that he could check to see if she was a U.S. citizen, but
that “he knew she was lying,” and needn’t do so.92 After her daughter arrived
with her U.S. passport, agents finally released Plascencia after a stream of
expletives.93
Shortly after her release, Plascencia filed suit in the Central District of
California alleging eleven causes of action including two for infliction of
emotional distress (IIED) (first intentional, and then negligent in the
alternative), and then a violation of California’s laws against discrimination
in public accommodation against the ICE agents under the FTCA. In
considering a motion to dismiss, the court handily dismissed elements of the
claim that were premised in federal constitutional law.94 However, the court

87

88

89
90
91
92
93
94

TENN. CODE § 4-21-102 (15) (2019) (“‘[p]laces of public accommodation, resort or amusement’
includes any place, store or other establishment . . . that supplies goods or services to the general
public or that solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the general public. . . .”). The distinction
between places that supply goods or services to the general public and those that accept their
patronage or trade indicates that a processing plant would fall under the statute’s textual ambit.
See, e.g., Arnett v. Domino’s Pizza I, L.L.C., 124 S.W 3d 529, 538-39 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
Immigration, or ICE, detainers are “written request[s] that a local jail or other law enforcement
agency detain an individual for an additional 48 hours after his or her release date in order to
provide ICE agents extra time to decide whether to take the individual into federal custody for
removal
purposes.”
Immigration
Detainers,
A M.
CIVIL
LIBERTIES
UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/immigrationdetainers [https://perma.cc/G95B-R9QL] (last visited May 14, 2021).
Plascencia v. U.S., 2018 WL 6133713 at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13-14.
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denied the motion for the state law claims alleging discrimination, noting that
the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity delineates between state and
federal constitutional torts in allowing federal tort liability.95 Interestingly,
the IIED claim also survived a motion to dismiss, elucidating a potentially
broad applicability of state constitutional tort law to vindicate longer-term
monetary damages (e.g., trauma-related therapy) against the federal
government, rather than just short-term pecuniary damages. 96 Shortly
thereafter, the government settled their claims before the theory could be
fully tested at trial.97
A parallel claim has been at least partially vindicated in the District of
Puerto Rico,98 though a motion to alter the initial judgment denying the
United States’ motion to dismiss was altered based on a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies—a key danger of this proposed solution. 99
Contemporarily, this Comment was inspired by the case of Andres SosaSegura in Washington State, who was removed by ICE from a Greyhound
bus in Spokane on presumably discriminatory grounds. 100 Mr. SosaSegura’s case is set for trial in the Eastern District of Washington in June of
2021, and will test if the ICE officers in question were acting in the scope of
their duty in a manner to necessarily subject them to “Washington law
pertaining to an arrest made by a law enforcement officer.”101 Litigated in
the same district (and adjudicated by the same judge) is a similar claim by
comedian and political asylee Mohanad Elshieky, who was also pulled off a
Greyhound bus in the same Spokane terminal as Mr. Sosa.102 Mr. Elshieky
similarly claims discrimination in a place of public accommodation, as
contemplated by the Washington Law Against Discrimination, as he was
humiliated by Customs and Border Patrol Agents by virtue of his status as an
asylee.103 Again in Mr. Elshieky’s case, the court took a dim view of the
United States’ sovereign immunity framing, focusing more on its argument
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

103

Id. at 12.
Id. But see discussion supra note 69 and accompanying text.
Notice of Settlement, No. 5:17-CV-02515, Id. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2017) (Dkt. No. 91).
Bonilla-Olmedo v. United States, 677 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (D.P.R. 2009).
Opinion and Order, No. 3:08-CV-01842, Id. (D.P.R. Aug. 4, 2008) (Dkt. No. 54; see discussion
regarding the Supremacy Clause infra Section III.B(ii).
Complaint, Sosa Segura v. United States, No. 2:19-CV-00219 (E.D. Wash. June 25, 2019) (Dkt.
No. 1).
Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgement, Id. (Dkt. No. 92).
See Richard Read, This Comedian Says Border Patrol Pulled Him Off a Bus. Now He’s Suing the Government,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-0221/comedian-border-patrol-libya-asylum [https://perma.cc/U8VP-TJNZ] (stating that Mr.
Elshieky suffered from “significant humiliation” from the enforcement officers’ treatment).
Id.
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whether the Spokane Intermodal Bus Terminal is a public
accommodation.104
This unique and novel theory of redress meets the statutory and
common-law requirements for a successful FTCA claim, as well as broader
theories surrounding suits against the federal government. For one, the
presumptive bar on state criminal liability against federal officers105 is not
implicated, as plaintiffs will bring their own private, civil claims, regardless
of any potential state prosecutions. Similarly, while the Westfall Act does
continue to bar independent state-law constitutional torts against federal
officers, as may have occurred pre-Bivens, this issue is not implicated here.106
While the use of civil rights tort schemes here is an intentional shadow for
broader federal Constitutional issues, they still are valid state statutory torts
that are intended to serve as the basis for FTCA liability. The Westfall Act
merely bars direct suits using state civil rights torts as the cause of action,
rather than using them as the basis for liability under the FTCA more
broadly. As stated, this approach has already been used effectively in
California, Puerto Rico, and Washington State.107
There are two broad limitations. First, there must be some clear invidious
intent to discriminate while acting in an official capacity, as is currently the
question in Sosa Segura.108 Importantly, this question will be tested under the
usually broader state analyses of intent, rather than Fourth Amendment

104

105

106
107

108

Compare Elshieky v. United States, No. 2:20-CV-00064-SAB, 2020 WL 3440557 at *4-5 (E.D.
Wash., June 23, 2020) with Segura v. United States, 418 F. Supp. 3d 605, 610 (E.D. Wash. 2019)
(“The United States urges this Court to skip the analogous conduct analysis and instead accept a
blanket rule that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for state civil rights
torts.”).
See, e.g., Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If federal agents are to perform their
duties vigorously, however, they cannot be unduly constrained by fear of state prosecutions.”),
vacated as moot; Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890) (“[I]f the prisoner is held in the state
court to answer for an act which . . . it was his duty to do as marshal of the United States, and if in
doing that act he did no more than what was necessary and proper for him to do, he cannot be
guilty of a crime under the law of the State . . . .”); but see United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200
U.S. 1, 8 (1906) (holding that federal agents acting unlawfully in the scope of their duties may be
tried criminally in state courts).
See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Disingenuous Demise and Death of Bivens, 2020 CATO S. CT. REV.
263, 279 (2021).
See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 418 F. Supp. 3d 605, 613 (E.D. Wash. 2019); Plascencia v. United
States, 2018 WL 6133713 at *13-14 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2018); Bonilla-Olmedo v. United States,
677 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (D.P.R. 2009).
See supra note 99.
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analyses that may be less favorable to plaintiffs.109 A deeper limit is that states
must have some form of civil rights statute that contemplates private action
against tortfeasors. This requirement does have a narrowing import on this
approach—as identified above, not all states have such a private right of
action.110 Based on this, it might seem that this remedy is only applicable in
the 33 states identified above. However, as will be explained below, states
that require administrative exhaustion are also barred as potential venues,
limiting the ambit to 24 states and the District of Columbia.111
B. Challenges
This approach is hardly unassailable, given that it represents a novel and
largely untested backdoor for Constitutional claims more broadly. There are
three broad and existential challenges to this proposal. First, it is possible
that government attorneys seeking to avoid liability might argue that such a
route to redress exceeds the plain meaning of the FTCA. Mechanically, this
approach also implicates Constitutional Supremacy concerns, both by virtue
of an already extant federal statutory scheme for civil rights violations, and
because of difficulties with subjecting the government to a state
administrative adjudication. While the textual analysis is dismissible, the
Supremacy concerns do limit the scope and applicability of this approach in
particular states.
1. Textualism
The Federal Tort Claims Act is an explicit waiver of federal sovereign
immunity that does not contemplate an exception for this avenue of redress.
In understanding the scope of an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity,
courts use two major canons of statutory interpretation to guide their
analysis. 112 First, such waivers must be expressed unequivocally in the
statutory text.113 Second, even if these waivers are explicit, their import is to
be “construed strictly in favor of the sovereign.”114 Combined, these provide
the general rule that any waiver of sovereign immunity, must be sufficiently

109

110
111
112
113
114

See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (“[E]ven if it be assumed that
such referrals [to secondary screening stations at border checkpoints] are made largely on the basis
of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive no constitutional violation.”).
See supra note 13.
See supra note 15.
See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Litigation with the Federal Government § 2.5, 94 (2016).
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-37 (1992).
McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951).
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grounded in text and legislative purpose to overcome a bias towards
immunizing the state from liability.115
The FTCA is clear in its unlimited warrant for the use of state tort
schemes as the basis of liability. The point and purpose of this waiver is to
allow the Act to “build upon the legal relationships formulated and
characterized by the States” in a manner “exemplary of the generally
interstitial character of federal law.”116 The FTCA only asks if a private actor
would be similarly liable to the plaintiff according to state law, and ignores
any cloak of immunity that federal officers may otherwise be garbed in, even
if the conduct in question is uniquely governmental in function.117 In Indian
Towing Co., Inc., v. United States, one of the first Supreme Court cases to
examine and discuss the FTCA, the Supreme Court held that the private
person analogy is grounded in the finding that a private person in “like
circumstances” would be liable.118 The Court explicitly rejected the idea that
the private person analogy requires the “same” conduct, otherwise “there
would be no liability for negligent performance of uniquely governmental
functions.”119 This logic indicates that federal law enforcement officers may
still be liable for tortious acts, as evinced by the Act’s statutory scheme.120

115

116
117
118
119
120

Gregory C. Sisk, Twilight for the Strict Construction of Waivers of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 92 N.C. L.
Rev. 1245, 1249-50 (2014) (“even if the statutory text is most naturally read to allow recovery by a
civil plaintiff against the United States under the circumstances alleged in a complaint, a minimally
plausible reading of the statute that instead favors the government is to be preferred.”).
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
Indian Towing Co., Inc. v. U.S., 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court goes on to refer to the idea of requiring exactly
parallel private activity to impose liability as “bizarre.” Id. at 67.
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 773 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[S]tatutory and decisional law
governs the determination of the United States’ liability under the FTCA.”); Coverage Issues under the
Indian Self-Determination Act, 22 Op. O.L.C. 65, 73 n.12 (1998) (“[A]lthough it is often stated that the
FTCA covers ‘common law torts,’ courts have held that liability under the FTCA is determined by
state statutory as well as common law.”). 28 U.S.C. § 2680 provides exceptions to federal liability
under the FTCA, including a carveout for intentional torts committed by federal tortfeasors. See id.
at § 2680(h). However, the same clause goes on to specifically waive immunity for federal law
enforcement officers committing the same torts—indicating contemplation that federal law
enforcement officers should be considered in the scope of liability. Cf. Liranzo v. United States, 690
F.3d 78, 80, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding that federal immigration officers erroneously
detaining a United States citizen was analogous to “a person who . . . places someone under arrest
for an alleged violation of the law–a so-called ‘citizen’s arrest.’”); Bolduc v. United States, 402 F.3d.
50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding federal agent was not liable for failing to provide exculpatory evidence
to federal prosecutors because private persons are not mandated to provide exculpatory evidence).
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This characterization comports with the basic precepts of the ordinary
meaning rule121—that is, classifying a state civil rights tort within the general
boundaries of FTCA liability would comport with the commonsense
meaning of the statutory text,122 and does not lead to an absurd result.123
Accordingly, the FTCA’s clear waiver certainly includes state civil rights
torts. While this waiver carries certain conditions,124 none relate to the type
or quality of torts that may form the basis of a cause of action.
2. Supremacy Clause
To some extent, the Supremacy Clause is implicated by this approach.
First, the existence of a parallel civil rights statutory scheme—42 U.S.C. §
1983—may preempt state civil rights statutes. At the same time, subjecting
federal officials to state administrative processes may violate the Supremacy
Clause. While the former is clearly not a valid limitation, the latter does
impose some further restrictions on the applicability of this remedy.
The federal sibling of state public accommodations statutes, 42 U.S.C. §
1983, explicitly prohibits discrimination or segregation “on the ground of
race, color, religion, or national origin” in places of public
accommodation. 125 This prohibition is accompanied with a federal
guaranteed private right of action.126 Moreover, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows for
aggrieved plaintiffs to use federal civil rights violations as a basis of action for
monetary relief.127
Neither the existence of these two programs, nor Supremacy Clause
jurisprudence generally, however, cuts against the availability of the
proposed remedy. First, private claims are limited in scope to injunctive
relief—monetary damages are foreclosed by the statute.128 Even if a plaintiff

121
122
123
124

125
126
127
128

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND
THE CONSTITUTION 41 (2016).
See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201 (1993) (basing the definition of a “country” on
the “commonsense meaning of the term” for the purposes of an FTCA action).
See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848, 861 (2009) (avoiding a statutory reading with an
“absurd” result).
§ 2674’s restrictions (1) keep the United States immunized with regard to interest prior to judgment
or for punitive damages, except in cases of death; (2) allow the United States to assert any defense
that otherwise would have been available to the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim; (3) as well as any others that it is normally entitled to; and (4) allow the Tennessee Valley
Authority certain special immunities. See also supra Section II.B.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1964).
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1964).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).

1138

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:5

were to attempt to enjoin a federal program through the injunctive relief
provided by this statute, they would likely face standing issues.129 Second, §
1983 suits are limited to those officers acting “under color of state law”—
given that this remedy seeks to redefine a damages remedy against federal
officers, § 1983 would not be helpful.
Despite parallel federal statutes, the Supremacy Clause and preemption
doctrine would not serve as a bar to this sort of action. Preemption only
serves as a bar when there is some form of direct conflict between a federal
and state statute.130 Here, no such conflict exists. The FTCA and federal
Constitutional protections are judicially-recognized as fully separate parallel
spheres.131 It is long recognized that state schemes that define the right of
state citizens that may go beyond the scope of federal civil rights provisions
are perfectly acceptable in the Supreme Court’s eyes.132
Less clear is if states that require plaintiffs to exhaust their claim in a state
administrative process could be venues for this form of redress. 133 As a
baseline, it is settled that federal officers may be sued for money damages in
state court.134 However it is less clear if federal officers may be enjoined by
a state administrative or judicial proceeding. 135 Accordingly states that

129

130

131

132

133
134

135

Cf. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983) (“[t]he reasonableness of . . . fear [of
reoccurring conduct] is dependent upon the likelihood of a recurrence of the allegedly unlawful
conduct” and “subjective apprehensions” are not enough to meet that standard). But see Friends of
the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184-85 (2000) (an “entirely
reasonable” proposition that an event will reoccur systematically is proof enough for injury in fact).
See, e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (“[W]e have long recognized that state
laws that conflict with federal law are without effect.”) (internal quotation omitted); Felder v. Casey,
487 U.S. 131, 153 (1988) (emphasizing that a state law that is “inconsistent in both purpose and
effect” with a federal law “must give way to vindication of the federal right . . . .”).
See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980) (“[W]hen Congress amended [the] FTCA in
1974 . . . the congressional comments accompanying that amendment made it crystal clear that
Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action.”).
Cf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (“[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to impose
greater restrictions . . . than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional
standards.”).
See CALABRESI, supra note 17.
See, e.g., Leroux v. Hudson, 109 U.S. 468 (1883); Sharpe v. Doyle, 102 U.S. (12 Otto.) 686 (1881);
Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1866); Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1852). See
also 17A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4213 (3d ed. 2021
Update), at n.2 (collecting the above cases).
Cf. Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 359 (1941) (questions of state courts enjoining federal officers
“have rarely been free from difficulty and it is not an easy matter to reconcile all the decisions of
the court in this class of cases.”) (internal quotations omitted). See also, Richard S. Arnold, The Power
of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE L. J. 1385, 1394 (1964) (“[T]he Supreme Court has
never decided the matter—although it might have done so had it not thought the question so
difficult and of such ‘grave consequence.’”) (citing Brooks at 360).
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require exhaustion of a state administrative process before plaintiffs have a
private right of action may not be able to serve as venues for this particular
theory.
Similarly, settled—albeit, aged—caselaw firmly states that state courts
may not interfere within the actions of the federal government in the
execution of federal law, based on principles of supremacy.136 However, this
does not rest on firm enough ground to be directly applicable to a potential
state administrative hearing over a claim of discrimination in a public
accommodation. First, the theory rests on principles outlined in Ableman v.
Booth and In re Tarble—cases examining the authority of a state court to
enforce a writ of habeas corpus on the United States military.137 Not only is the
habeas writ not implicated in this theory, but also the grounds upon which
Ableman and In re Tarble were decided appear to be historically shaky.138
Even notwithstanding Ableman and In re Tarble, it is not apparent that
requiring the federal government to appear in state administrative
proceedings would fall afoul of any jurisdictional or Constitutional edict.
While a representative of the federal government would be required to
appear on behalf of the federal tortfeasor, this is hardly an enjoinment, such
that it may fall afoul of a potential problem with enjoining federal officers.
Moreover, to the extent that the end outcome of these administrative
proceedings is necessarily money damages, 139 there appears to be clear
constitutionally-derived precedent indicating that this approach would be
valid.140 On the other hand, this may be a moot point, as the FTCA requires
that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims brought
under its ambit.141 Certainly, a state administrative proceeding runs contrary
to that. More broadly, it is possible that a broader reading of the Supremacy
Clause142 and the possibility for annoyance and embarrassment of federal

136

137
138

139
140
141
142

In re Tarble, 80 U.S. 397, 407 (1871) (“Whenever, therefore, any conflict arises between the
enactments of the two sovereignties [states and the national government], or in the enforcement of
their asserted authorities, those of the National government must have supremacy . . . .”); Ableman
v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 524 (1858) (“No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that
the party is imprisoned under the authority of the United States, has any right to interfere with him
. . . .”).
See supra note 136.
See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 430-37 (7th ed.
2015) (describing numerous issues with the holdings of Ableman and In re Tarble).
As is the case in the states described supra note 14.
See Richards, 369 U.S. at 6.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
See discussion of the Supremacy Clause and state civil rights statutory schemes supra Section II.B(ii).
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officers in state court would caution against such a procedure.143 Finally, and
most shallowly, it could merely be improper that questions this “important”
be left to a state administrative proceeding.144 Such a topic is ripe for future
research and exploration. At minimum, however, states with mandatory
administrative exhaustion may be inappropriate venues to test such backdoor
Bivens claims.
CONCLUSION
This is a particularly salient moment in which to consider civil rights
remedies against federal tortfeasors. The recent increase in federal
immigration enforcement, for example, has raised a host of allegations and
lawsuits based on federal officers’ violating civil rights.145 Of course, absent
congressional action to codify the Bivens doctrine, it is unlikely that
discrimination in and of itself will be actionable. Using the FTCA to
vindicate civil rights through the lens of state law, therefore, could be an
invaluable tool in preventing discrimination by federal officers, especially in
places of public accommodation.
Put simply, the use of the FTCA outlined in this Comment provides a
fresh path for monetary damages against federal tortfeasors in an era where
they continue to narrow or disappear. Persons in the 24 states mentioned
above and the District of Columbia have a new path to ensure that when
their state civil rights are violated by federal employees or officers, they may
at least seek some form of financial redress against the officers involved. Until
and unless Bivens is codified, this may be limited in scope, but at least allows
some redress against the federal government. Such an approach might have
paid dividends for Esperanza Bonilla-Olmedo, and likely already has for
Guadalupe Plascencia. 146 It may yet pay dividends for Andres Sosa-Segura
and Mohanad Elshieky. At the very least its application may allow, as Justice
143
144
145

146

In re Tarble, 80 U.S. at 408.
Richard S. Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officials, 73 YALE L. J. 1385, 1403 (1964)
(“[Federal] officials are just too important to be left to the mercy of state judges.”).
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa (examining whether a U.S. Border Patrol agent violated a child’s
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights); cf. Jonathan Levinson, New Civil Rights Lawsuit Filed Against
Federal Law Enforcement for Actions in Portland, OR. PUB. BROAD. (July 21, 2020),
https://www.opb.org/news/article/federal-police-law-enforcement-portland-oregon-civil-rightslawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/L3P2-BDP9] (discussing a lawsuit examining whether federal law
enforcement officers violated Tenth Amendment rights by using violent measures to control
protesters); Caitlin Dickerson, Migrant Children Are Entitled to Toothbrushes and Soap, Federal Court Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/15/us/migrant-childrentoothbrushes-court.html [https://perma.cc/C55B-GWRB].
See Plascencia v. United States, 2018 WL 6133713 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2018).
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Brennan put it, for the “protective force of state law”147 to guarantee us the
full realization of our rights by providing at least some small avenue of redress
against federal tortfeasors.

147

William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489,
491 (1977).

